Microcosmic Model
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A Mathematical Starting Point

The greatest challenge for any metaphysical scheme is to explain how each of us is able to possess or access an effective model of the world.  This is the problem of the microcosm.  Surely, all of our mathematical knowledge ought to provide us with some clues as to the structure of the relation between cosmos and the microcosmos.

Holography provides an intriguing optical model, but it would have to be greatly expanded to touch upon the dynamics and generality of our mental maps.  Any such expansion would have to rely mainly on pure mathematics.  If there were to be room for physics it would likely involve models for quantum computing.

Preliminary to mathematical modeling there must be a concise account of the metaphysical problem.  This first step would be crucial, but in the early stages there may be considerable back and forth between the mathematical and metaphysical modeling.

To the best of my knowledge, the scientific community has barely even a clue as to the structure of our mind maps.  Cognitivists place this problem in the area of natural intelligence.  The only serious modeling of natural intelligence comes from the discipline of artificial intelligence.  There the problem is to transform vast databases into a workable intelligence.  Computational brute force is the only strategy to-date.

How do you put IQ into a machine?  Where is the program that will enable a machine to transform data into knowledge?  It has recently been learned that the bulk of the genetic differences between humans and monkeys is carried on only about 100 out of our common pool of 100,000 genes.  Each gene contains several thousand base pairs.  The total informational difference between our IQ of about 120 and a monkey’s IQ of about 40 could then be contained in a modest computer program of less than 100,000 lines of program code.  Nature stumbled on these lines of codes by shear accident.  And the best minds in the world do not have a clue.  If this does not constitute a reduction to absurdity of reductionism, then what possibly could?

Needless to say, we shall try another path.
 

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rev. 10/25/98